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Observation and Quantum Objectivity
Abstract
The paradox of Wigner’s friend challenges the objectivity of description in
quantum theory. A pragmatist interpretation can meet this challenge by judi-
cious appeal to decoherence. On this interpretation, quantum theory provides
situated agents with resources for predicting and explaining what happens in
the physical world—not conscious observations of it. Even in Wigner’s friend
scenarios, differently situated agents agree on the objective content of state-
ments about the values of physical magnitudes. In more realistic circumstances
quantum Darwinism also permits differently situated agents equal observational
access to evaluate their truth. In this view, quantum theory has nothing to say
about consciousness or conscious experiences of observers. But it does prompt
us to reexamine the significance even of everyday claims about the physical
world.
1 Introduction
Wigner (1967) presented his ”friend paradox” to motivate the view that con-
sciousness has a special role to play in quantum theory—by collapsing the
quantum state. In a more recent discussion, D’Espagnat (2005) argued that
a consistent treatment of the Wigner’s friend scenario may be given (without
collapse) if the descriptive content underlying quantum theory is restricted to
probabilistic predictions flowing from the Born Rule, but only if these concern
conscious experiences of observers. In contrast, a recent pragmatist proposal
(Healey 2012) views quantum theory as a resource for situated agents (rather
than observers) with no requirement that these be conscious.1 If quantum the-
ory is interpreted along these pragmatist lines, Wigner’s friend scenarios may
be treated consistently and without ambiguity.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyzes distinct notions of ob-
jectivity relevant to quantum theory. Section 3 recalls the paradox of Wigner’s
friend. The pragmatist interpretation of Healey (2012) is sketched in section
4. Section 5 shows how this resolves the paradox while securing the objectivity
of description in quantum theory. Section 6 addresses a more general worry
about objectivity of description. Section 7 relates the foregoing treatment of
objectivity to a recent suggestion (Ollivier et al. 2004) that objective properties
emerge from subjective quantum states through quantum Darwinism. While
a pragmatist view of quantum theory secures the objectivity of a claim about
the values of physical magnitudes, it recognizes that its content depends on the
environmental context. The conclusion points out that this involves a subtle
1As far as we know, conscious humans are the only agents currently able to avail themselves
of this resource. But this view admits the possibility that non-human, or even non-conscious,
situated agents may come to use quantum theory.
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change in our understanding of how even the familiar language of everyday af-
fairs, including laboratory procedures, assigns objective properties–beables–to
objects (Bell 2004).
2 Objectivity
Objectivity (and its polar opposite, subjectivity) can mean many things. Dreams
are a paradigm of subjectivity. The subject matter of a dream is not objective:
a dream does not portray what really happens. The mode of presentation is
not objective: this subject matter is accessible only to the dreamer. What is
presented as well as its mode of presentation strongly depends on the specific as
well as the general features of the dreamer—her individual physiology, psychol-
ogy and prior experiences as well as her humanity (Dick 1968). By contrast,
a description or mathematical representation in physics has an objective sub-
ject matter if its content represents physical reality, and an objective mode of
presentation to the extent that how this is represented does not depend on the
specific and general features of the one whose representation it is.
The prominence of notions of observation or measurement in standard formu-
lations of quantum theory raises concerns about the objectivity of descriptions
in that theory. If the Born Rule is understood to yield probabilities just for
results of observations/measurements then one can question the objectivity of
these results. The orthodox view—that a quantum measurement cannot be un-
derstood generally as revealing the value of the measured observable—has now
been amply supported by ”no-go” theorems (Gleason 1957, Kochen and Specker
1967, Fine 1982, Mermin 1993). This challenges the objectivity of subject mat-
ter in a description of the result of an observation. One can respond to this
challenge by proposing an analysis of observation/measurement as an objective
physical process. But the assumption that quantum theory can itself represent
this process leads to the notorious quantum measurement problem (Fine 1970,
Brown 1986, Bassi and Ghirardi 2000). The alternative of characterizing obser-
vation independently as a physical interaction with a macroscopic apparatus,
and/or involving irreversible amplification involves the ”shifty split” between
quantum and classical descriptions justifiably criticized in Bell (2004).
With his keen appreciation of how difficult it is to provide a satisfactory phys-
ical characterization of observation/measurement in quantum theory, Wigner
came to think that a measurement in quantum theory occurs just when a con-
scious observer becomes aware of a result. On this view, the Born Rule yields
probabilities only for alternative conscious experiences. It thereby threatens
both the objectivity of the subject matter of description in quantum theory
and the objectivity of its mode of presentation. Quantum theory, it seems, is
then concerned to predict and (perhaps) explain ”communicable human expe-
rience. In other words...the set of all the impressions human minds may have
and communicate to others.” (D’Espagnat 2005)2
2The Wigner’s friend scenario casts doubt even on such communicability. D’Espagnat’s
paper seeks to relieve this doubt.
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Suppose one so restricts the scope of quantum theory. Then the descriptive
claims to which the Born Rule attaches probabilities fail to be objective in
several respects:
(1) Their subject matter is not a physical reality independent of our experi-
ences.
(2) Their mode of presentation depends on the individual consciousness.
(3) This consciousness is generically human.
One could seek to restore this third respect of objectivity by generalizing beyond
humans to observers capable of any sufficiently sophisticated form of conscious
experience. But since consciousness is not well understood (especially in non-
humans) to do so would further obscure the content of these descriptive claims,
which would still fail to be objective in either of the first two respects.
While the quantum theory of environmental decoherence does not by itself
resolve the quantum measurement problem (D’Espagnat 1990, Bub 1997, Adler
2000), many believe it may contribute to a resolution within some appropriate
interpretative framework. Such a framework appears in (Healey 2012), and is
sketched in section 4 below. From the present perspective, the key interpre-
tative proposal is to remove any talk of observation or measurement from a
formulation of the Born Rule by taking this to generate mathematical probabil-
ity distributions over claims that simply describe values of magnitudes rather
than results of observing them. The ”no-go” theorems block this approach if one
further assumes that every claim over which these mathematical distributions
are defined always has a well-defined content, so an agent should believe it to a
degree specified by its Born ”probability” to avoid refutation by statistics of ac-
tual observations. But suppose, on the other hand, that how much significance
attaches to a claim about a system depends on the extent of environmental
decoherence suffered by its quantum state. Then the numbers yielded by the
Born rule have the import of genuine probabilities only for significant claims:
Born rule ”probabilities” for claims lacking such significance do not correspond
to (actual or hypothetical) frequencies, and should not guide an agent’s degrees
of belief in these insignificant claims.
On this view any reference to observation or measurement has been elimi-
nated from the Born rule as well as other basic principles of quantum theory,
and so there is no reason to suppose that descriptive claims that arise in quan-
tum theory are subjective in any of the respects (1)-(3) noted above. But there
is a fourth aspect of objectivity to consider, as the following quote makes clear.
A view or form of thought is more objective than another if it relies
less on the specifics of the individual’s makeup and position in the
world, or on the character of the particular type of creature that he
is. (Nagel 1986)
If the significance for an agent of a descriptive claim about the value of a
magnitude depends on how that agent is situated in the world, then that claim
may lack a kind of objectivity. Differently positioned agents could understand
the claim differently: they may come to a no-fault disagreement about whether
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it is true, or even meaningful. The interpretation of Healey (2012) faces such a
challenge to its understanding of the objectivity of descriptive claims in quantum
theory—a challenge that is highlighted by the Wigner’s friend scenario, as we
shall see.
3 Wigner’s friend
The “paradox” of Wigner’s friend presents a challenge to the objectivity of
physical description within quantum theory. To set up the “paradox”, imag-
ine Schro¨dinger’s cat (and associated ‘diabolical device’) replaced by a human
experimenter (Wigner’s friend, John) who records in a device D the result of
a quantum measurement of observable Q he performs on a system s inside his
isolated laboratory.3 Eugene and John both agree that the quantum state of
s is initially (at time t i) a non-trivial superposition of eigenstates of Q. Let C
be the claim that the value of a recording magnitude M on D is m at time tf
after s has interacted with D. John looks at D at tf and makes claim C. On the
basis of this observation, he assigns a ”collapsed” quantum state to D+s.4 En-
vironmental interactions within the laboratory rapidly entangle this ”collapsed”
state with the state of everything else in the laboratory. But the total quantum
state |ψJ〉 of the enormously complex system composed of John, D and every-
thing else inside the laboratory will continue to reflect the ”collapse” onto an
eigenstate of M induced by John’s measurement.
Meanwhile Eugene, who has remained outside the laboratory, assigns a state
|ψE〉 to the enormously complex system composed of John, D and everything
else inside the laboratory, based on all the information about the properties of
systems to which he has access in this situation. For Eugene, John’s measure-
ment involves purely unitary interactions—between s and D, between D and
John, and between all these systems and the rest of the laboratory. Accord-
ingly, he evolves the state |ψE〉 unitarily, with no ”collapse” from t i to tf . Since
|ψJ(tf )〉 6= |ψE(tf )〉, John’s and Eugene’s quantum states differ after John’s
measurement but before Eugene enters the laboratory. As these states are usu-
ally understood, |ψJ (tf )〉 represents a definite result of John’s measurement
(recorded by the state of D, John’s memory, etc.) while |ψE(tf )〉 excludes any
such definite result and its traces. To retain its internal consistency, this view of
quantum states must deny the objectivity of John’s measurement result, since
differently situated agents (John and Eugene) disagree about whether C is true
at tf .
3To call the laboratory ‘isolated’, is to require by fiat the absence of any decohering in-
teractions with its external environment. So we are talking of a ridiculously impractical
Gedankenexperiment, as Schro¨dinger explicitly said he was when describing his cat scenario.
The point of doing so is to show how this raises a problem for one view of quantum theory
and then to explain why this problem does not arise on the pragmatist view of Healey (2012).
4He does so in accordance with a view of quantum states due to Dirac and von Neu-
mann. While himself subscribing to this orthodoxy, Wigner maintained that it is only John’s
consciousness that induces the collapse.
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On any view of quantum states, since |ψE(tf )〉 is an eigenstate of some ex-
tremely complex observable O on the entire laboratory system, Eugene could
in principle (though certainly not in practice) distinguish between |ψJ (tf )〉 and
|ψE(tf )〉 by creating a suitable ensemble of identical laboratory systems and
measuring O on each system: |ψE(tf )〉 would give the same result on each,
while |ψJ (tf )〉 would almost certainly yield a statistical spread of different re-
sults. This same procedure would also, in principle, enable Eugene to distinguish
between |ψE(tf )〉 and the mixed state ρJ(tf ) =
∑
i |ci|
2 |ψJ(tf )〉i 〈ψJ(tf )|i Eu-
gene may assign to reflect his ignorance of the result of John’s measurement.5
Wigner’s own way of resolving this paradox was to give consciousness (and
only consciousness) the distinctive physical role of inducing ”collapse” of the
quantum state onto an eigenstate of the measured observable. For him, it
was the interaction with John’s consciousness that produced a discontinuous
physical change inside the laboratory, resulting in the final state |ψJ (tf )〉 and
not |ψE(tf )〉. Such a change would be detectable in principle in the Wigner’s
friend scenario, though quite impossible to detect in practice. I will offer a
different resolution involving no such physical ”collapse”. This involves the
different understanding of quantum states described in the next section.
4 A pragmatist interpretation
In quantum theory as it is usually formulated, theoretical models involve quan-
tum states and operators corresponding to observables (including the Hamilto-
nian and/or Lagrangian) and (solutions to) the Schro¨dinger equation and rela-
tivistic generalizations. But there is still no agreement as to how, or whether,
any of these model elements represent physical magnitudes.
According to Healey (2012), observables, quantum states and their evo-
lution neither represent nor describe the condition or behavior of any physical
system. It follows that quantum theory does not imply statements one can
use to make claims about natural phenomena that describe or represent fea-
tures of those phenomena. But quantum theory nevertheless helps us to predict
and explain an extraordinary variety of physical phenomena using representa-
tional resources from outside of quantum theory. It can do this because of the
way in which theoretical models involving quantum states, operators, and the
Schro¨dinger equation are applied. There are principles for using these models
to guide one in making descriptive claims and forming representational beliefs
about physical systems to which such models may be applied but which these
models do not themselves describe or represent.
The dispute as to whether quantum theory provides a complete descrip-
tion of a physical system presupposes that quantum states at least provide a
partial description or representation of the physical properties of systems to
which they are assigned. Rejecting this presupposition may seem tantamount
5To keep things simple, here I assume John made an ideal measurement on the state∑
ici |ϕi〉, thereby collapsing the state of s+D onto some eigenstate |ϕj〉 |ψj〉 with probability
|cj |
2.
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to regarding the quantum state as merely a symbolic device for calculating prob-
abilities of possible measurement outcomes on these systems. But this is not so.
Assignment of a quantum state may be viewed as merely the first step in a pro-
cedure that licenses a user of quantum theory to express claims about physical
systems in descriptive language and then warrants that user in adopting ap-
propriate epistemic attitudes toward these claims. The language in which such
claims are expressed is not the language of quantum states or operators, and
the claims are not about probabilities or measurement results: they are about
the values of magnitudes. That is why Healey (2012) refers to such claims as
NQMC’s—Non-Quantum Magnitude Claims. Here are some typical examples
of NQMC’s:
A helium atom with energy −24.6 electron volts has zero angular
momentum.
Silver atoms emerging from a Stern-Gerlach device each have angular-
momentum component either +~/2 or −~/2 in the z -direction.
The fourth photon will strike the left-hand side of the screen.
When a constant voltage V is applied across a Josephson junction,
an alternating current I with frequency 2(e/h)V flows across the
junction.
(Notice that two of these non-quantum claims are stated in terms of Planck’s
constant.) For contrast, here are some quantum claims which do not describe
the physical properties of systems to which they pertain:
The expectation value of angular momentum for atomic helium in
the ground state is 0.
Integral-spin systems have symmetric quantum states, while half-
integral-spin systems have antisymmetric quantum states.
The probability that a tritium nucleus will decay in 12.3 years is 1
2
.
After one photon from the polarization-entangled Bell state |Φ+> is
found to be horizontally polarized, the other photon has polarization
state |H>.
This is not to say that quantum mechanical claims like these lack truth-
values—each is appropriately evaluated as objectively true (though in the case
of the last claim that evaluation is critically dependent on the context relative
to which it is made). But the function of such claims is not to describe or
represent properties of physical systems: it is to offer authoritative advice to a
physically situated agent on the content and credibility of NQMC’s concerning
them. Quantum theory contributes indirectly to our predictive and explanatory
projects.
A quantum state and the consequent Born probabilities can be assigned
to a system only relative to the physical situation of an (actual or hypothetical)
agent for whom these assignments would yield good epistemic advice. What
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one agent should believe may be quite different from what another agent in a
different physical, and therefore epistemic, situation should find credible. This
relational character of quantum states and Born probabilities does not make
these subjective, and it may be neglected whenever users of quantum theory find
themselves in relevantly similar physical situations. NQMC’s are not relational
in this way: Their truth-values do not depend on the physical situation of any
actual or hypothetical agent.
On this pragmatist understanding, a quantum state guides an agent
in two different ways. The agent requires guidance in assessing the content of
NQMC’s about systems of interest in a context where such claims may arise. It is
often said that assignment of a value to an observable on a system is meaningful
only in the presence of some apparatus capable of measuring the value of that
observable. But some account of meaning must be offered in support of this
assertion, and the extreme operationist account that is most naturally associated
with it would be unacceptably vague even if it were otherwise defensible. Exactly
what counts as the presence of an apparatus capable of measuring the value of
an observable?
Contemporary pragmatist approaches to meaning have the resources
to provide a better account of the significance of a NQMC about a system,
as entertained by an agent, in a context in which that system features. A
pragmatist like Brandom (1994, 2000) takes the content of any claim to be
articulated by the material inferences (practical as well as theoretical) in which it
may figure as premise or conclusion. These inferences may vary with the context
in which a claim arises, so the content of the claim depends on that context. The
quantum state modulates the content of NQMC’s about a system by specifying
the context in which they arise. The context may be specified by the nature and
degree of environmental decoherence suffered by this quantum state. A NQMC
about a system when the quantum state has extensively decohered in a basis
of eigenstates of the operator corresponding to that magnitude on the system
has a correspondingly well-defined meaning: a rich content accrues to it via the
large variety of material inferences that may legitimately be drawn to and from
the NQMC in that context. Call a NQMC canonical if it is of the form M ∈ ∆:
Magnitude M has value in Borel set ∆ of real numbers.
Only when the content of a canonical NQMC is sufficiently well articulated
in this way is it appropriate to apply the Born Rule to assign a probability to
that claim.
For example, a claim that an electron passed unobservably through a par-
ticular slit in a diffraction grating figures as premise or conclusion in almost
no interesting material inferences, and so is very poorly articulated. This is a
consequence of the fact that, in the absence of interactions capable of revealing
its presence, the quantum state of the electron suffers negligible decoherence
through entanglement with the environment in the interferometer. With no
significant decoherence between different spatially localized quantum states, an
agent has only a very limited license to use claims about the electron’s position.
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In particular, the license is so limited that little may legitimately be inferred
from such claims. But the subsequent interaction with detectors at the screen
involves massive environmentally induced decoherence of the initial quantum
state of electron plus detector, permitting a high degree of articulation of the
content of claims about the value of a magnitude on the detector taken to record
the position of the electron at the screen. The decohered quantum state then
grants an agent a wide license to formulate and use NQMC’s about records of
the electron’s position at the screen. This illustrates the first way in which a
quantum state guides an agent—by advising her on the extent of her license to
use particular NQMC’s by informing her of the nature and degree of that state’s
environmental decoherence.
With a sufficiently extended license, an agent may now apply the Born
Rule to evaluate the probability of each licensed canonical NQMC using the
appropriate quantum state. In the example, this will be the initial superposed
state of the electron. Lacking more direct observational information, after as-
signing the quantum state of a system appropriate to her physical situation, an
agent should adjust her degrees of belief in licensed NQMC’s pertaining to that
system so they match the probabilities of NQMC’s specified by the Born Rule.
This is the second way in which a quantum state guides an agent.
An agent should accept this twofold guidance by the quantum state
appropriate for one in her physical situation, since by doing so she is able suc-
cessfully to predict and explain what happens in a wide variety of circumstances.
But according to Healey (2012) she need not, and should not, take this quan-
tum state to describe or represent ontological features of a system to which she
ascribes it. The interpretation does not deny that environmental decoherence
involves a physical process. But it does deny that decoherence of the quantum
state represents changes in intrinsic properties of a physical system. An agent
appeals to the quantum theory of decoherence to decide what to think about
the content and credibility of NQMCs about a physical system, not to describe
the evolving properties of a system whose quantum state decoheres.
5 Paradox resolved
Consider the situation of Wigner’s friend John inside his isolated laboratory.
According to the pragmatist interpretation sketched in the previous section,
John is licensed by decoherence to apply the Born Rule to the superposed state
of s and advised by quantum theory to adjust his credences in claims about
the value of recording magnitude M on D at time tf so they match the corre-
sponding Born probabilities. This is because the phase of the quantum state
he consequently assigned to D+s immediately before has, by tf , been robustly
delocalized into the environment inside his laboratory. He is then warranted by
his own direct observation of D in making the significant claim C that the value
of M on D is m.
Meanwhile Eugene, who has remained outside the laboratory, assigns state
|ψE〉 to the enormously complex system composed of John, D and everything
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else in the laboratory. By assumption, the phase of state |ψE〉 has not been
delocalized into its environment by tf , so this state does not license Eugene to
entertain any significant claim about the value of a magnitude on the laboratory
or anything in it. In this situation, Eugene should not apply the Born Rule to
|ψE〉 and adjust any of his credences accordingly. If and only if the laboratory
ceases to be isolated so as to delocalize the phase of |ψE〉 (as Eugene subse-
quently enters it, for example) would Eugene be in a position to apply the Born
Rule to significant claims about the laboratory or traces it leaves in an external
recording device (such as his own brain).
Recall the difficulties presented by the Wigner’s friend scenario noted in
section 3:
1) As these states are usually understood, |ψJ (tf )〉 represents a definite result
of John’s measurement (recorded by the state of D, John’s memory, etc.) while
|ψE(tf )〉 excludes any such definite result and traces of it in John’s laboratory.
2) On any view of quantum states, since |ψE(tf )〉 is an eigenstate of some
extremely complex observable O on the entire laboratory system, Eugene could
in principle (though certainly not in practice) distinguish between |ψE(tf )〉 and
|ψJ(tf )〉 (or ρJ(tf )) by creating a suitable ensemble of identical laboratory sys-
tems and measuring O on each system.
These difficulties present a challenge to the objectivity of physical description
here. (1) apparently implies that, by assigning different quantum states to the
contents of John’s laboratory at tf , John and Eugene come to disagree about the
truth-value of the descriptive claim C. If so, they can both be right only if that
truth-value is relative to the physical situation of the agent making it—in conflict
with the fourth aspect of objectivity noted in section 2. But (2) shows that such
relativization of truth-value to agent-situation still leaves it unclear how John
and Eugene can consistently apply quantum theory here. Independent of the
practicality of Eugene’s discriminatory measurements, |ψE(tf )〉 and |ψJ(tf )〉 (or
ρJ(tf )) are distinct states, yielding incompatible Born probabilities concerning
the possible values of certain magnitudes on the entire laboratory. Relativization
of the laboratory’s quantum state to the situations of Eugene, John, respectively
leaves it ambiguous on which of these states quantum theory advises them to
base their expectations about these possible values.
The pragmatist of the previous section responds to this challenge, first by
rejecting the usual understanding of the states |ψJ (tf )〉, |ψE(tf )〉. For her,
neither state has the function of representing the physical properties of John’s
laboratory or anything in it. Since neither state represents anything bearing
on the result of John’s measurement (e.g. whether or not C is true at tf ),
assignment of both states to John’s laboratory at the same time could not lead
John and Eugene to assign (apparently) conflicting truth-values to C.
But John and Eugene each assume that John will perform a measurement
on s by interacting s appropriately with D, and that the environment inside
the laboratory will decohere the state of D+s in D ’s ”pointer basis” (without
inducing any physical collapse in that state). So both John and Eugene are
licensed to entertain claim C and (beforehand) to set their credences for C at
tf equal to the corresponding Born Rule probability. This implies they agree
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that C has a truth-value at tf . But while Eugene remains outside the laboratory,
only John is in a position to look at D at and after tf and so determine what
that truth-value is. This secures the objectivity of the description C, in the sense
that differently positioned agents (John and Eugene, in this case) agree that C
has a truth-value after tf , and do not disagree about what that truth-value is.
At this stage, John, but not Eugene, is in a position to know that C is true
rather than false. Eugene can choose whether or not to enter the laboratory to
try to find out whether C is true.
Suppose Eugene decides to see for himself the outcome of John’s observation
by entering the laboratory just after tf . This will decohere the phase of |ψE(tf )〉,
permitting Eugene to apply the Born Rule to this state to adjust his degrees of
belief in various significant claims about the contents of the laboratory, including
C, John’s record of the outcome in his notebook, John’s verbal report, etc. as
well as correlations between such claims. The Born probabilities of these claims
(joint as well as single) based on the state |ψE(tf )〉 will lead him to the following
confident expectation: whatever may be the outcome of John’s observation, the
laboratory will contain multiple mutually supporting records of it. Nothing
about |ψE(tf )〉 will tell him what John’s outcome actually was. But he can
easily find that out by asking John and observing any of the other multiple,
correlated records inside the laboratory. The important point is that |ψE(tf )〉
does not exclude an outcome at tf , so by entering the laboratory Eugene simply
finds out what happened—he does not make it happen.
If Eugene were instead (able) to remain outside the laboratory but interact
with it so as to measure the value of O, he should use |ψE(tf )〉 to calculate a
Born probability of 1 that a suitable recording device, applied to the laboratory
and decohered in its ”pointer basis” by external environmental interactions,
will record a value of O equal to the eigenvalue of its corresponding operator
in state |ψE(tf )〉. Even though Eugene assumes that John records the outcome
of his measurement at tf , by tf there has been no physical interaction between
Eugene and anything inside the laboratory that could serve to inform Eugene
of that outcome. So Eugene cannot base his expectation of the outcome of
a measurement of O on |ψJ(tf )〉, and would be mistaken if he were to base
that expectation on ρJ (tf ). There is no ambiguity about to what state Eugene
should apply the Born Rule when setting his credences concerning the outcome
of his O measurement.
On what quantum state should John base his credence as to the outcome
of an external O -measurement? The outcome of John’s measurement should
prompt him to update his quantum state for objects in his laboratory. These
include D, s and other systems inside the laboratory, but not himself, con-
sidered as a physical system: the function of John’s quantum state is to set
his credences concerning claims about these other systems, but not about him-
self. John should not base his credences as to the outcome of an external O -
measurement on either of the states |ψJ (tf )〉 or ρJ(tf ), since these are states of
himself as well as everything else in his laboratory. He can hypothetically take
the ”external” perspective of Eugene, but if he does so he must then assign the
same state |ψE(tf )〉 that he agrees is the correct state for someone in Eugene’s
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situation. There is no ambiguity as to which quantum state should be used to
calculate Born probabilities for the results of external measurements performed
on the entire laboratory, in the sense that differently positioned agents (John
and Eugene, in this case) agree on this state. Of course, only Eugene is then in
a position to make such a measurement.
What will Eugene find if he enters the laboratory after measuring the value
of O in this way? D will no longer have a record of the truth of C. Even
if John still exists, he will not remember that C was verified as true at tf .
Because Oˆ fails to commute with the operator corresponding to M, as well as
an effective ”pointer observable” on every other system correlated with this
through interactions within the laboratory, the external interaction required to
record the value of O will have so disturbed the laboratory and its contents as
to remove all traces that C was true at tf . But one can’t change the past: C
was indeed true at tf , as John then verified with his own eyes.
There is, in principle, an even more dramatic way to erase all traces of
C. Since the entire laboratory and its contents constitutes an isolated system,
Eugene will take |ψE〉 to have evolved unitarily from its state |ψE(ti)〉 prior to
John’s measurement on s to its state |ψE(tf )〉 = Uif |ψE(ti)〉. The state Eugene
should ascribe to the contents of the laboratory at ti should reflect his belief
that his friend has not yet performed the planned measurement: this will assign
Born probability 1 to claims about D, John and other items in the laboratory
that suffices to substantiate this full belief. Mathematically, there will exist a
Hamiltonian that would induce the time-reversed evolution of |ψE〉 so that at
a later time tg(where tg − tf = tf − ti) it is restored to its value before John’s
measurement: |ψE(tg)〉 = U
†
fg |ψE(tf )〉 = |ψE(ti)〉.
If Eugene had the powers of a quantum demon, he could instantaneously re-
place the original Hamiltonian by this time-reversing Hamiltonian at tf , thereby
restoring |ψE〉 at tg to its original value at ti. Suppose that he does so, and
postpones his entry into the laboratory until tg. Since the quantum state of the
entire laboratory is identical to what it was before John had made any measure-
ment, Eugene must fully expect that if he then asks John about the result of
his measurement, John will say he has not yet performed any measurement. He
must further fully expect that his own examination at, and at any time after,
tg of D, John’s notebook, and anything else inside the laboratory will reveal
no record of any such measurement ever having been made. Eugene’s action at
tf has, by tg, erased all traces of John’s measurement and its result: Indeed,
Eugene has succeeded in erasing all traces of everything that happened inside
the laboratory between ti and tf . Once again, he has not changed the past. But
there has been a wholesale loss of history, understood as reliable information
about the past. This point will be pursued in the concluding discussion. The
present section has shown how the pragmatist view of Healey (2012) maintains
the objectivity of physical description in the Wigner’s friend scenario.
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6 Objectivity secured
According to Healey (2012), John inside the laboratory and Eugene outside
do not assign inconsistent truth-values to claim C. Moreover, each assigns the
same rich content to C based on the decoherence of the state of s+D induced by
environmental interactions inside the laboratory. This certifies the objectivity
of C ’s content in the Wigner’s friend scenario. The certification depends on the
fact that both John and Eugene apply essentially the same model of decoherence
to the same initial quantum state of s+D.
But, according to Healey (2012), while quantum states are objective they are
also relational: the quantum state an agent should assign to a system generally
depends on the (actual or hypothetical) physical situation of that agent. If
differently situated agents assign different quantum states to a system, this
raises the possibility that their models of its decoherence will so differ as to lead
each to assign a different content to certain claims concerning it. Relativization
of quantum state ascriptions threatens relativization of the content of NQMCs
like C. This would undermine their objectivity in the fourth respect pointed out
in section 2.
Now even though John and Eugene are differently situated in the Wigner’s
friend scenario, each can choose to adopt the perspective of the other’s situation
for the purpose of applying quantum theory. Eugene should assign the same
initial state as John to s because each knows that this is the state on which John
will perform his measurement. Eugene and John are each in the same state of
ignorance as to the initial state of D and its (lack of) correlations with that
of s, so there is no reason for them to assign different states either to D alone
or to s+D. (Their conclusion—that interactions within the laboratory robustly
decohere the state of s+D and so endow C with rich content—is not sensitive
to fine details of the initial state of s+D.)
One might object that Eugene’s physical situation requires him to assign the
state |ψE〉 to the contents of the laboratory, and that since the phase of |ψE〉 is
not delocalized into its environment Eugene should not assign a rich content to
C. An alternative objection would be that C has no unambiguous content for
Eugene, since he has no principled reason to base his assessment of that content
on the degree of decoherence of the ”internal” state of s+D rather than that of
|ψE〉.
But in assessing the content of an NQMC such as C about a system (D in this
case), an agent like Eugene should base his model of decoherence on quantum
state assignments incorporating everything he is in a position to know about
the physical situation of D, as represented in non-quantum claims. We have
assumed that Eugene is in a position to know that John will initiate a certain
interaction between s and D inside the laboratory. Eugene’s physical situation
does not require him to assign the state |ψE〉 to the contents of the laboratory
when assessing the content of C : to do so would be to neglect information to
which he has access in this situation that is relevant to assignment of quantum
states to s and D.
There are circumstances in which agents are so differently situated that they
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correctly assign different quantum states to the same system, where each agent’s
assignment is based on all information to which the agent has access, given her
physical situation.6 If models of decoherence based on such different assignments
were to result in these agents assigning different contents to the same NQMC,
that could threaten the objectivity of description in quantum theory. To assess
the threat we need to specify how far different agents’ state assignments may
differ, and how this affects the models of decoherence they should employ in
assessing the content of relevant NQMCs.
The example in footnote 6 prompts the following restriction on different
agents’ state assignments: If Alice assigns a mixed state to a system while
Bob assigns a pure state, then Bob’s state vector lies in the support of Alice’s
density matrix. An argument for a generalization of this restriction has been
offered (Brun et al. 2002): Different agents’ state assignments by several density
matrices are mutually compatible if and only if the supports of all of them have
a least one vector in common.
Suppose differently situated agents (such as Alice and Bob in the example)
assign quantum states to a system S that differ in some way consistent with this
generalized restriction. Assuming this is the only difference between the models
of decoherence they use in assessing the content of NQMCs about S, there are no
grounds for thinking they will arrive at different assessments. By assumption,
all their models share the generic features of applying the same Hamiltonians
to the same initial state of S ’s environment with the same limitations on prior
system/environment entanglement. Since a model with these generic features
will decohere the phase of a generic pure state of S to the same extent in the
same ”basis”7, that is how it will model the decoherence of every vector in the
Hilbert space in which lies the vector common to the supports of all the states
assigned by differently situated agents subject to the generalized restriction. It
follows that the model of decoherence each of these agents uses to assess the
content of NQMCs about S will lead each agent to the same assessment of the
contents of NQMCs about S. This means they will all agree on the content of
these NQMCs, thereby securing their objectivity.
7 Independent Verifiability
It is ironic that observation poses a threat to the objectivity of physical descrip-
tion in quantum theory, since observation is generally used to settle questions
about objectivity in science and daily life. Doubting the objective presence of
the dagger he saw, Macbeth tried to grasp it: to prove that Banquo’s ghost
occupied his own place at table, he pleaded his guests to see for themselves.
Classical physics permits multiple, independent observations on a system to
6This happens, for example, when Alice and Bob perform spacelike separated polarization
measurements on an entangled photon pair. Knowing his outcome, Bob can assign a polariza-
tion eigenstate to the photon entering Alice’s detector. Since this information is not accessible
to Alice, she correctly assigns that photon a mixed polarization state.
7The scare quotes mark the need to allow for models in which decoherence effectively
”diagonalizes” s’s density operator in an overcomplete basis of narrow Gaussian states.
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verify a claim about its state, since none of these need irremediably disturb
that state.
But suppose an individual system is in a wholly unknown quantum state. No
single observation on it can reliably disclose its state. Repeated observations are
no better, since observing a system typically irreparably disturbs its quantum
state. So even if a system’s wholly unknown quantum state could be ascertained
by a single observation, this finding could not be checked in further observations,
either by the original agent or by others. A wholly unknown quantum state of
an individual system is not as objective as a corresponding classical state in the
sense that it is not independently verifiable. Ollivier et al. (2004) put the point
like this:
The key feature distinguishing the classical realm from the quantum
substrate is its objective existence.
They propose what they call an operational definition of objectivity for a
property of a quantum system, according to which such a property is simulta-
neously accessible to many observers who are able to find out what it is without
prior knowledge and who can arrive at a consensus about it without prior agree-
ment. Their idea is that such a property is objective to the extent that multiple
records of it exist in separate portions of the environment, so that “observers
probing fractions of the environment can act as if the system had a state of its
own—an objective state.” They say that
The existence of an objective property requires the presence of its
complete and redundant imprint in the environment as necessary
and sufficient conditions.
While Ollivier et al. (2004) never say exactly what they mean by a property,
it seems clear they would count an NQMC locating a value in ∆ of a magnitude
M on system S as a property assignment to S.
The state of a system in classical physics is specified by a point in phase
space: this is equivalent to an assignment of a value to each magnitude on that
system, i.e. an assignment of a property locating that value in a unit set. The
authors’ stand-in for the objective state of an open quantum system is one of the
eigenvectors of the system observable corresponding to the pointer magnitude
that is selected by environmental decoherence. A NQMC locating a value in ∆
to the pointer magnitude on system S is taken to assign S an objective property
solely on the grounds that a complete and redundant imprint is present in the
environment. There are other magnitudes on S represented by operators each
of whose eigenvectors is ”close” to an eigenvector of the pointer observable. A
NQMC locating a value in ∆ to such a magnitude on system S also counts as
assigning S a reasonably objective property because of a complete and (slightly
less) redundant imprint in the environment. Their idea seems to be that the
proliferation of imprints of properties of a quantum system in its environment
progressively objectifies its properties until these come to mimic properties that
characterize a classical state. An eigenvector of the pointer observable stands in
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for an objective state by specifying what properties of the system are objectified
by the environmental interactions to which it is subjected.
...amplification of a preferred observable happens almost as inevitably
as decoherence, and leads to objective classical reality.
This is Quantum Darwinism: ”the idea that the perceived classical reality
is a consequence of the selective proliferation of information about the system”.
It is not an account of classical reality, or of the actual objective state of a
quantum system. It is an account of how independent acts of observation on a
system’s environment can produce consensus on properties of a quantum system
irrespective of whether or not that system has such properties. One is reminded
of Wittgenstein’s remark in his Philosophical Investigations
As if someone were to buy several copies of the morning paper to
assure himself that what it said was true.
Wittgenstein’s avid reader is actually in better shape than multiple quantum
observers. The morning paper may have correctly reported what happened.
But if no NQMCs about a quantum system are true then it lacks the properties
observers attribute to it, so whatever proliferates is in fact misinformation. It
is important not to be misled by the causal language of imprints into thinking
that objective properties of the environment are caused by objective properties
of a decohered quantum system. As it stands,Quantum Darwinism (Ollivier
et al. 2004) fails to provide an adequate account of objectivity in the sense of
the independent verifiability of NQMCs because it does nothing to show how
those NQMCs can be objectively true, given the quantum states of system and
environment. Groupthink does not amount to intersubjective verification. But
the pragmatist view of Healey (2012) can help the quantum Darwinist take this
crucial last step.
In that view, decoherence endows certain NCMCs with a significant content
that requires even differently situated agents to seek agreement on their truth-
values. When a system is decohered by its environment, these will include
claims about the value of its pointer magnitude. They will also include claims
about magnitudes on subsystems of the environment that are correlated with
the system’s pointer magnitude. Since properties not only of the system but
also of subsystems of its environment are in this sense objective, it makes sense
to ask whether objective claims about a system can be independently verified
by observing various portions of its environment. Quantum Darwinism may
now offer illuminating answers to this question by providing quantum models of
interactions between a quantum system and its multipartite environment. This
would be a way to show how differently situated agents can come to agree on
the truth-values of significant NQMCs about a system without disturbing its
state.
15
8 Conclusion
Reflection on the paradox of Wigner’s friend has persuaded some people that
quantum theory cannot be understood without careful attention to the role of
conscious human experience (Wigner 1967, D’Espagnat 2005). But a pragmatist
interpretation (Healey 2012) permits a consistent and unambiguous treatment
of the paradox without reference to consciousness. Situated agents can use
quantum theory to make objective claims about the values of magnitudes in
the physical world, not just about observations of them. This has helped us to
predict and explain an enormous variety of otherwise puzzling physical phenom-
ena. A true claim about the value of a physical magnitude states an objective
physical fact. Ordinarily, such facts are readily independently verifiable. But
acceptance of quantum theory requires one to countenance the possibility that in
extraordinary circumstances information about the value of a magnitude could
be irretrievably erased, making this fact no longer verifiable.
A simple magnitude claim ascribes an objective property to a physical sys-
tem. But the content of this claim is a function of the environmental context.
This means that the property ascribed is not intrinsic, but relational. In the
case of quantum field theory, it implies that any claim about particles has a
well-defined content only in some contexts, while other contexts give signifi-
cance to a claim about (classical) fields. In assessing the content of a claim,
an agent should consider the nature and extent of environmental delocalization
of coherence. This content does not depend on the (actual or hypothetical)
physical situation of the agent, even when agents base their assessments on the
different quantum states appropriate to their different physical (and therefore
epistemic) situations.
Science is based on observed facts, and quantum theory is no exception.
According to Healey (2012), what makes quantum theory exceptional is what it
teaches us about the nature of these facts. Bell (2004, 41) introduced the term
’beable’ because he thought
it should be possible to say of a system not that such and such may
be observed to be so but that such and such be so.
When making a significant claim about the value of a magnitude on a quan-
tum system one is saying that it be so, according to Healey (2012). Perhaps
this makes this magnitude a beable in Bell’s sense. But Bell (2004 52) goes on
to say
the beables ... can be described ”in classical terms”, because they are
there. The beables must include the settings of switches and knobs
on experimental equipment, the currents in coils, and the readings
of instruments.
and (Bell 2004, 174)
The beables of the theory are those elements which might correspond
to elements of reality, to things which exist.
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These passages at least suggest that acceptance of quantum theory in no
way modifies the content of claims about values of magnitudes—a content that
is somehow established by a fixed representation relation that obtains between
language and the world (actual, or merely possible if a beable be not)! A
pragmatist cannot accept such a representational account of how content accrues
to a claim (Brandom 1994, 2000). According to the pragmatist interpretation
of Healey (2012), to understand quantum theory one needs instead to adopt an
alternative inferentialist account of what gives a claim content. By modifying
the inferential relations between magnitude claims, quantum theory affects their
content, rendering this contextual. By making the content of a magnitude claim
about a system a function of the environment, acceptance of quantum theory
cautions one against taking that claim to attribute an intrinsic property to
a non-contextually existing object, even while insisting on the objectivity of
the claim. This should make one think differently even about the content of
everyday claims about ordinary things like the settings of switches and knobs on
experimental equipment, the currents in coils, and the readings of instruments.
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